One of the distinctive features of the obligation to obey the law is its content-independence. We ought to do what the law commands because the law commands it, and not because of the law's content-i.e., the independent merits of the actions it prescribes. Despite its popularity, the notion of content-independence is marked by ambiguity. In this paper, I first clarify what content-independence is. I then develop a simple test-the "content-independence test"-that allows us to establish whether any candidate justification of the obligation to obey the law delivers genuine content-independence. I apply this test to prominent such justifications and conclude that several of them, surprisingly, fail it.
Introduction
Consider the following dialogue.
John: "Damn! Another fine!" Traffic warden: "Sir, the light was red, and you drove through."
John: "But there was nobody around. I didn't endanger anyone. Now give me a good reason why I should have stopped!" Traffic warden: "The law says so."
Is the traffic warden right? Answering in the affirmative means vindicating political authority and the corresponding pro tanto moral obligation (or duty) to obey the law.
1 Doing so is no easy task. It involves explaining something rather puzzling: the clearly sets out a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for a successful justification of political authority, shows that-contrary to first appearancesprominent candidate justifications fail to meet that condition, and highlights an important feature of justifications that do meet the condition.
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I proceed as follows. In Section 2, I consider what content-independence is a property of. In Section 3, I distinguish content-independence from other, related notions, and devise a test that allows us to establish whether any purported justification of political authority does indeed vindicate a content-independent obligation to obey the law: the "content-independence test" (for short, "CIT"). In
Sections 4 and 5, I sort some prominent justifications of political authority into those that pass the CIT and those that fail it. In Section 6, I draw some brief lessons from this discussion and conclude.
Before starting, let me clarify terminology. First, I define authority as the moral power to place others under pro tanto obligations to do as one commands 5 One may wonder whether content-independence is indeed a necessary feature of the obligation to obey the law "proper." In line with much of the literature, the present paper is developed under the assumption that it is. Skeptics about content-independence as a feature of political obligation are thus unlikely to be moved by my arguments. For reviews of the literature on political obligation and authority that state the content-independence condition, see, e.g., Lefkowitz, supra note 2; William (where "pro tanto" means "susceptible to being overridden"). 6 Suppose A commands B to φ. If A has authority over B, then B ought to φ because A has required B to φ.
Second, I understand political authority as the moral power of the state to issue binding commands through law. Finally, I call the pro tanto obligation of obedience that the law places on citizens political obligation. (For ease of exposition, I will often omit the qualification "pro tanto" when referring to political obligation.)
What is content-independence a property of?
If one is politically obligated to φ, one ought to φ because the law commands φ-ing, not by virtue of the independent goodness of φ-ing. This is why political obligation is associated with the notion of content-independence. But what, exactly, is contentindependence a property of? Two answers are in principle possible, each offering a distinctive interpretation of the expression "having a duty to do what the law commands because the law commands it," i.e., a duty to obey the law. 
Having a duty to do what the law commands [because the law commands it].
6 For some, the obligation to obey is owed to the authority (i.e., it is correlative to the authority's right), and the authority may then hold those who disobey to account for their failures. Here, I remain agnostic about this feature of authority. My arguments apply whether the obligation to obey is taken to be correlative to a right or not. For defences of the rights-correlativity of authority-imposed duties, As observed by Scott Hershovitz, on interpretation (1), a duty to obey the law is a duty whose content involves performing certain actions for a particular reason (and not others), namely the fact that the law has issued a directive to that effect. In this case, content-independence is a property of an agent's obligatory "subjective" reasons for action. On interpretation (2), by contrast, the obligation to do as the law commands is justified by appeal to the fact that the law commands it. In this case, content-independence is a property of the justification of the duty to obey.
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Which of these two interpretations is preferable? Interpretation (1) seems implausible. 9 To see this, assume, for example, that John has an obligation to obey tax law in sense (1). Assume, further, that John does pay his taxes as prescribed by the law, but that his subjective reason for doing so is not that the law requires him to pay-as demanded by (1) normally use the language of obedience, nor does it seem substantively plausible to conclude that, by paying his taxes (as he ought to), John has acted wrongly.
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In response, one could suggest that interpretation (1) is more suited as an account of virtuous (rather than rightful) acting. Note, however, that this suggestion is plausible only in those cases where one's obligation to φ really is justified by the fact that the law requires one to φ, i.e., where interpretation (2) is satisfied.
Otherwise, we would have to face the implausible implication that agents may act non-virtuously even when they act for the reasons that in fact justify the obligations that they have.
To see this, let us stipulate, for the sake of argument, that what justifies people's obligation to stop at red lights is not the fact that the law requires it, but broader considerations of safety. Amber always stops, but she does so not because the law requires it, but because this is safest for everyone. On the "virtue" reading of interpretation (1), by so acting, she displays a lack of virtuous character. But, surely, we would want to say that the virtuous agent is precisely the one who acts for the right reasons, i.e., for the reasons that justify the obligations that she has. 11 So, even as an account of virtuous action, as opposed to rightful or wrongful action, interpretation (1) only makes sense in those cases where it is true that one's obligation to φ is justified by the fact that the law demands that one φs.
10 Hershovitz comes to the same conclusion, by pointing out that the law is often indifferent to why we act as it commands, so long as we act as commanded. See Hershovitz, supra note 6 at 67-68. For a similar argument, see also Perry, supra note 9 at 14. Cf. Joseph Raz, Authority and Justification, 14 PHILOS. PUBLIC AFF. 3-29 (1985) , at 7.
In light of these considerations, I will focus on interpretation (2), and treat we should distinguish content-independence from content-insensitivity and judgement-independence. A failure to recognize these distinctions may be responsible for misplaced scepticism about the very possibility of there being a content-independent obligation to obey the law.
Content-independence, content-insensitivity, and judgement-independence
First, content-independence should not be confused with content-insensitivity. 13 The fact that what justifies political obligation must be a property of the law qua law, and not of its content, is compatible with political obligation being conditional on the content of legal commands meeting certain standards of moral acceptability. 14 This is a familiar phenomenon. (1) of the obligation to obey the law, discussed and rejected in the previous section. One may thus wonder whether, on the "exclusionary reasons" framework, an authoritative command to φ gives us an obligation to [φ because it was commanded, and not because of excluded reasons (not) to φ].
For critical discussion, see Hershovitz, supra note 6 at 69.
hard not because authority negates our autonomy. The difficulty lies in explaining how the mere fact that some entity (e.g., the law) has issued a command to φ places us under an obligation to φ.
The content-independence test
If legal commands are to have any authority, some underlying principle must be invoked which allows us to explain why it is that "φ-ing being the object of a legal command" matters morally. Political obligation does not presuppose a dubious derivation of an ought from an is. Instead, its justification involves identifying a morally salient property P that attaches to the law qua law, and thereby explains why the fact that a certain action is prescribed or prohibited by law is morally significant.
Consider a legal command to φ, and the claim that we ought to obey it because it displays property P. Now let us suppose that the command is "You ought to pay 10 dollars for this book" and that P is "fairness." Although, at first, this may look like a justification for an authority-based obligation to φ, it is not. The relevant property P has little to do with the fact that φ-ing is prescribed by law, but attaches to its independent merits: 10 dollars is the fair price for the book in question.
Therefore, P only justifies a content-dependent obligation to φ.
To determine whether the authority-justifying property P proposed by any given theory of political obligation/authority meets the content-independence condition, we can subject it to the following, simple content-independence test.
Content-independence test (CIT):
Take a set of legal commands and assume that they satisfy property P, proposed by a particular theory purporting to vindicate political obligation. Then, do (A) or (B).
A. Holding everything else constant, take one (or more) of those commands-e.g., the command to φ-and change its content to φ*, where φ*-ing does not violate the constraints of content-sensitivity (i.e., it is not morally impermissible). If the relevant property P is no longer satisfied by the modified command(s), we will know that P fails to establish a content-independent obligation to obey the law because it is the law.
B.
Holding everything else constant, imagine a new legal directive to φ* is introduced, where φ*-ing does not violate the constraints of content-sensitivity (i.e., it is not morally impermissible). If the new directive does not satisfy property P, we will know that P fails to establish a content-independent obligation to obey the law because it is the law.
As should be apparent, both (A) and (B) involve changing the content of the law, the former by modifying existing laws, the latter by introducing new ones. The rationale behind this test is simple. If the obligation to obey the law is content-independent, then it must continue to exist even if the contents of the law-i.e., the actions that are its object-vary, provided they fall within the bounds of moral permissibility.
But if property P, invoked to justify the authority of law, is not displayed by legal commands robustly across variations in their content, then P cannot justify an obligation to obey the law because it is the law. P, in that case, cannot attach to the law as such: i.e., to legal directives qua legal directives.
These reflections may seem obvious, but appear to have been overlooked. As an application of the CIT in subsequent sections will show, prominent defences of the obligation to obey the law fail to pass it: they rely on morally salient properties that attach not to legal commands as such, but to the independent merits of their content.
Applying the test I: Theories that fail it

Instrumentalism
Instrumentalist theories justify authority by appeal to the benefits it brings to its subjects. The most influential version of instrumentalism is Joseph Raz's "service conception" of authority. In its original formulation, the service conception offers a schema for the justification of practical authority in general, rather than of the authority of law specifically. Still, that schema lends itself to being applied to the case of political authority. On this conception, the law has authority over an agent whenever he "would better conform to reasons that apply to him anyway […] Three objections might be raised at this point. First, it may be argued that the instrumentalist formula is compatible with the "tracked reasons" being of a procedural nature-as opposed to concerning the substance of the issue at hand-in which case my objection would no longer hold. For example, we may have most reason to act on the basis of democratic decisions; and if the law is democratically arrived at, following it maximizes our reason-compliance, independently of its content. The difficulty with this objection, as Scott Hershovitz has pointed out, is that it presupposes an implausibly broad interpretation of instrumentalism. On this interpretation, the theory loses its distinctiveness, and becomes compatible with all competing accounts of political authority (since each of them points to a particular set of reasons that apply to us, and which are said to justify an obligation to obey the law).
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Second, it may be objected that my discussion misunderstands the contentindependence condition, as proponents of instrumentalism conceive of it. Contentindependence, so the objection goes, is a property of one's reasons for acting as the authority demands when the relevant conditions for its justification are satisfied.
Those conditions, in turn, may well depend on the content of the commands issued by the authority. This means that in the first set of cases discussed above, where the content of the law is such that P is satisfied, Sam ought to [pay the amount prescribed by law because the law prescribes it].
The trouble with this response is that, as shown in Section 2, this understanding of content-independence-associated with interpretation (1) of the obligation to obey-is implausible. If the arguments in that section are correct, retreating to this understanding of content-independence will not make for a convincing defence of instrumentalism.
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Third, it may be pointed out that, for Raz, the law's authority is evaluated relative to domains: i.e., classes of directives, not individual ones. The law has authority in a domain D, relative to a subject S, whenever the putative subject would better comply with the reasons that apply to him in that domain by following the law rather than his judgment. In other words, relative to domain D (e.g., traffic regulation, taxation, food safety, etc.) the law "gets it right" more than the subject would. Domains of authority so conceived vary from individual to individual. To use Raz's own example, while the law has authority in the domain of drug safety for the vast majority of the population, it lacks such authority vis-à-vis an expert pharmacologist.
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Considerations of content matter to the identification of the domains in which the law has authority: the domains in which it exhibits P relative to a given subject. However, once we are within a domain in which the law exhibits P, legal directives are binding irrespective of content, including on those occasions when they are mistaken, and following our own judgment would deliver better reasoncompliance.
Given this, my objection may seem to misfire. Recall that, in line with the CIT, the objection involved changing the content of a few legal directives such that, relative to those, Sam would be better off by following his own judgment than by being guided by the directives. But changing the content of a few directives, so the reasoning goes, need not make a difference to the law's authority relative to the domain of tax contribution as a whole. If it is true that, by and large, Sam is better off by following the law in that domain rather than his judgment-even once we take into account my envisaged change in content-then Sam ought to follow the law in that domain even in those particular instances where the law gets it "more wrong" than he would. If, however, changing the content of legal directives as I have in my example suffices to make the law less accurate than Sam's judgment in the domain of tax contribution as a whole, then Sam lacks a content-independent obligation to obey it in that domain.
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Crucial to the present response to my argument is the notion of a domain within which the law has authority. For the response to be successful, a domain of legal authority has to be defined independently of the set of individual legal directives that exhibit P. If a domain were just a set of legal directives that individually exhibit P, changing the content of a single directive such that it no longer satisfies P would automatically strip that directive of authority. In that case, morally permissible variations in content would clearly affect the authoritativeness of legal directives: the CIT would not be passed. no proper part of the domain regarding which the person or body can be known to fail the conditions." Raz, supra note 15 at 1027, added emphasis. This quotation is not fully transparent, but can be interpreted as suggesting that, for any domain in which the person or body exhibits P (on the whole), the person or body has authority except for those "proper parts" of the domain for which it is known to fail to exhibit P. Presumably, those "proper parts" will be identified by looking at specific directives and asking whether they are known to exhibit P: if the answer is "no," the directives will be removed from the domain of authority. Two points in relation to this response are worth making. First, Raz's short passage suggests that valid authority rests not Of course, one can construct domains in such a way that, within them, content-independence is achieved. The content of a few individual directives may change such that they no longer satisfy P, but this is consistent with authority being kept within the domain as a whole, hence with respect to those directives too. But, as I hope to have shown, this result is theoretically dubious if it is the mere product of an artificial adjustment of domains.
Furthermore, adjusting domains so as to obtain content-independence is substantively implausible. This implausibility is brought out, unwittingly, in Raz's own discussion of the classic "red light on an empty street" scenario. Raz offers this discussion to showcase the virtues of his view. But in so doing, he seems to me to highlight a difficulty instead.
Raz considers the worry that, in the "red light on an empty street" scenario, one is obviously better off by crossing the street-contrary to the law-than by following the law's directives. Raz maintains that this observation does not invalidate the law's authority within the domain of traffic regulation, including in cases where, by hypothesis, ignoring a red light is the thing to do. This is because, within that domain, we are by and large better off by deferring to the law. Raz puts the point as follows. His passage is worth quoting in full:
From our vantage point we have invented an example in which the question [whether to stop] does not arise since the answer (there is no reason [to stop]) merely on directives exhibiting P, but on it being known that they exhibit P. This differs from Raz's official formulation of the service conception and creates ambiguities (which, however, I
do not have the space to explore here). Second, this way of individuating domains of authority is susceptible to my original objection: a change in the content of a directive may make a difference to whether that directive is known to satisfy P, hence to whether it is authoritative.
Thanks to Massimo Renzo and Daniel Viehoff for discussion.
is plain. But for the man in our example the question does arise; he has to discover whether there is no reason to stop. And if he is to inquire in this case, he has to inquire in many other cases. For us it looks ridiculous to hear him say, 'I am bound to follow authority regardless of the merits of the individual case,' for we know in advance what the merits are and forget that he has to find that out, and not only now but in many other cases as well.
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This explanation is puzzling. It is not true that, when we are faced with a traffic light on an empty street, we need to work hard to find out what the merits of the situation are. Those are precisely cases where hard work is unnecessary, which is why we are better off following our judgment and crossing the street anyway. By contrast, when the traffic situation is more complex, we have reason to defer to the law, since the cognitive burden of figuring things out would be excessive and the risk of accidents high.
It is artificial to suggest that, because we are better off deferring to the law when traffic is heavy-hence most of the time-in the domain of traffic regulation, the law is always authoritative, even when in fact we would be better off by following our own judgment. 26 The view expressed in the latter statement does deliver content-independence (in the domain of traffic regulation), but it is substantively implausible: it is at odds with our lived moral experience. And, as I said earlier, it is also arbitrary. In fact, why not distinguish between the domains of "traffic regulation with heavy traffic" and "traffic regulation when there is no traffic"? And so on.
Unless instrumentalists can provide a non-arbitrary criterion for domaindemarcation, they should abandon reference to domains, and consider legal commands one by one, asking whether each command displays property P, in relation to a particular agent A, given the agent's state at time t, when the command is issued. But if this is how a substantively plausible and non-arbitrary version of instrumentalism works, then my original objection still applies. Variations in the content of the law make a difference to whether the law displays property P, hence to its moral bindingness. A plausible version of instrumentalism fails the CIT.
Fair play
Fair-play perspectives on political authority come in many variants, but the general principle underlying them has been succinctly stated by John Rawls: "We are not to gain from the cooperative labors of others without doing our fair share." 27 Fair-play theorists believe that this principle has important implications for political obligation. Citizens, they remark, benefit from the cooperative labors of others, in the form of receiving public goods and enjoying the stability offered by the rule of law. This puts them under an obligation to reciprocate, by doing their fair share in sustaining society. Doing otherwise would be equal to freeriding on others'
cooperation. But what counts as doing one's fair share? Fair-play theorists answer:
obeying the law. The property P of legal commands that justifies obeying them, on a fair-play account, is the following.
P: "corresponding to what one ought to do as one's fair share in a cooperative practice from which one benefits."
Let us run the CIT. Take the legal command "This year, you ought to pay 30000 dollars in taxes." Assume that the total sacrifice imposed by this legal command, combined with all other legal requirements, satisfies P, i.e., it amounts to your fair share of contribution. Now change the content of one legal command. For instance, assume that you are legally required to pay 35000 dollars instead. Everything else is exactly as it was before, hence there is no possibility for a "discount in burdens"
somewhere else in the system. This being so, obedience to the new package of laws cannot correspond to doing your fair share anymore. Obedience now involves a net excess burden of 5000 dollars. Fair-play theory fails the CIT.
It might be objected that, provided the content of the law falls within the morally admissible range-as it does ex hypothesi in the cases I am discussingvariations in content make no difference to obedience corresponding to one's fair share. For example, anything between 20000 and 40000 dollars to be paid in taxes may be consistent with the law's demands corresponding to your fair share.
However, anything more or less would automatically push the system outside the constraints of moral permissibility.
This response involves a suspicious reverse-engineering of the notion of a fair share, such that it fits anything the law demands within the constraints of moral permissibility. The question we are addressing is: Why ought we to do whatever the law demands, provided it is not morally impermissible? Fair play theorists answer by appeal to the idea that doing so corresponds to doing one's fair share. But for this answer to justify the duty to obey the law, the notion of a fair share it invokes must not, by definition, be "whatever the law demands, provided it is not morally impermissible." If this is our definition of a fair share, then fair play theory will not justify the obligation to obey the law by reference to an independent notion of a fair
share, but will simply assume that obligation.
Another objector might complain that I have misinterpreted the fair-play view, insofar as, on its most plausible version, that view need not appeal to an independent notion of a fair share in the first place. 28 Instead, the view is best interpreted as stating that: If one benefits from a cooperative practice, thanks to others' compliance with its terms of cooperation, one ought also to abide by those terms (provided these are not morally impermissible). Property P, for fair play theory, would then turn into P'. P': "corresponding to the (morally permissible) terms of a cooperative practice from which one benefits."
Permissible variations in the content of the law arguably do not make a difference to its exhibiting property P'. Of course, we may conceive of changes in legal content that would make participation in the state (i.e., the cooperative practice on which we are focusing) no longer beneficial. However, those changes would likely be morally approach to obedience, where we ought to do as the law says not "because it is the law," but because and to the extent that doing so is mutually beneficial. This would make the revised version of fair play more independently plausible, but would again fail to vindicate a content-independent obligation to obey the law.
It may be objected that the above discussion conflates content-independence with another feature of the obligation to obey the law, typically called "generality."
This is the idea that the obligation to obey the law binds one to obey all laws, and not only a subset of them. In response, I note that, although content-independence and generality are related, they are not the same. It is in fact possible to have generality without content-independence, for instance, when an obligation to comply with all laws in a given system is vindicated, but contingently on the laws having the content that they do. But whenever a certain property P fails to vindicate generality due to some laws' having a given content, it automatically also fails to vindicate content-independence.
In sum, if I am right, the most plausible version of fair play theory fails the CIT. One could engineer a view in the vicinity of fair play that arguably does not fail the CIT, but this view neither appears properly to capture the moral rationale behind fair play, nor does it seem particularly plausible on its own terms. 
Natural duties: negative and positive
Natural-duty accounts of legitimate political authority hold that political obligation is justified by appeal to duties every human being holds just by virtue of being human, independently of voluntary acts or transactions. The relevant natural duties can be either positive-e.g., Samaritan duties to rescue others from certain perilsor negative-e.g., duties not to pose unjust threats to others. The duty of justice to support just institutions (or not to impose unjust ones) also belongs to the family of natural duties, though its status as a positive or negative duty is somewhat contentious.
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Let me begin with positive duties of Samaritanism. These duties demand that we contribute our fair share in rescuing others from significant dangers. Proponents of Samaritanism in the context of political obligation note that the state of nature poses significant dangers to human beings, by constantly threatening them with war and instability. Since, so the argument goes, only under general laws can these dangers be avoided, Samaritan duties demand obedience to the law. Such obedience compliance with the law: the road is empty. In fact, if everyone, in A's situation, were to cross the road, the benefits of traffic regulation would still be delivered. So we are not dealing with an instance of freeriding. Yet, on the "rule of law" interpretation of fair play, crossing the road would count as unfair. This suggests that the "rule of law" interpretation is ad hoc and substantively dubious: it stipulates that one's fair share in reciprocating benefits always amounts to what the law demands.
corresponds to doing one's fair share in rescuing others from the dangers of the state of nature. 33 On Samaritan views, then, property P is characterised as follows:
P: "corresponding to one's fair share in rescuing others from significant dangers."
It is easy to see that property P cannot vindicate an obligation to obey the law irrespective of content. It suffers from exactly the same difficulties that plagued the first version of the fair play view. If law with content C corresponds to one's fair share of burdens, law with content C*-where C* implies a different share of burdens-will not.
Proponents of Samaritanism too may respond by removing all reference to doing one's fair share, turning P into P'. dangers. Universal lack of payment of that tax is perfectly compatible with the continued existence of the rule of law, peace and security. (And, plausibly, one may do a lot more to help those in danger by giving one dollar to Oxfam or some other charitable organization.)
It might be objected that by not paying, one is undermining the state's provision of vital services. What if, for instance, the funds collected through this new tax were intended for the public healthcare system? The issue with this objection is that, on the Samaritan view, what people are meant to be "rescued from"
thanks to others' compliance with the law is not less-than-optimal healthcare, but the dangers of the state of nature. And even if not paying this passport tax would result in a failure to marginally improve the health service, it clearly would not send society back to state-of-nature conditions.
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In sum, while obedience to a good portion of the law may be necessary to satisfy P', P' fails to vindicate a content-independent obligation to obey the law because it is the law. Whether obedience is necessary to discharge one's Samaritan obligations depends on the content of the various laws one is subjected to.
Let us now turn to defences of political obligation based on a duty not to impose unjust threats on others. to a common legal framework, and obedience to it, is necessary for individuals not to pose unjust threats, as they instead do in the state of nature.
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P: "corresponding to what one must do not to pose unjust threats to others."
If my concerns about the revised version of Samaritanism are valid, then they seem equally to apply to the "unjust threats" version of the natural-duty argument. The example involving the passport tax proves the same point in this case. It is unclear how, by not paying that tax, one would pose an unjust threat to others (unless we stipulate, problematically, that disobedience to the law by definition constitutes an unjust threat). Even universal failure to pay that tax would not send us back to the state of nature. So again, while obedience to a good portion of the law may be necessary to satisfy P, on the unjust threats view, P fails to vindicate a contentindependent obligation to obey the law because it is the law.
Finally, natural-duty-of-justice views hold that obedience to the law is necessary in order to promote justice (or not to be implicated in injustice): i.e., to respect persons' rights. Depending on one's understanding of what, exactly, justice is about, natural-duty views might collapse into one of the previous two. LAW 19-27 (2007) , at 24. present section are hopefully sufficient to show that natural-duty-of-justice views fail the CIT, at least when considered purely on their own terms (i.e., without being combined with democratic theories).
Membership-based/associative views
A large set of theories of political obligation can be classified under the label of "membership" or "associative" views. Kingdom no longer identify with their country after its decision to leave the EU. On a subjectivist account, once Brexit comes into effect-with the associated legal changes-UK law will lack the power to obligate them. Similarly, on an objectivist account, changes in legal content that make an association no longer serve the relevant values-e.g., justice, reciprocity, equal respect, etc.-result in the law's failure to exhibit P. This being so, associativist views too do not pass the CIT.
It may be objected that this conclusion is too quick. Of course, to the extent that certain variations in content result in the law no longer displaying P, associative views do not deliver content-independence. At the same time, we can imagine a range of cases across which variations in content do not affect the value of an association, hence do not undermine the law's possession of P. For instance, imagine that the United States decided to follow several European jurisdictions and introduced "Bad Samaritan laws," which criminalize failures of easy rescue. This would be a change in the content of the law-new laws would be added-yet one that seems unlikely to make a difference to the value of the association "United
States," whether this is understood subjectively or objectively. This suggests that, within a somewhat restricted range, content-independence obtains.
The difficulty with this response is that it trivializes the requirement of content-independence. The requirement would be satisfied for morally permissible variations in content that, in turn, meet some further content-dependent condition C.
In the case of associative views, C corresponds to "consistency with an association being valuable." But note that all other theories of political obligation canvassed up to this point would also fit this schema. For instrumentalists, C equals "the content of the law is such that following it ensures better reason-compliance;" for fair-play theorists, it is "the content of the law corresponds to one's fair share;" for naturalduty theorists, C corresponds to "the content of the law is such that obedience to it is necessary to escape the perils of the state of nature;" and so forth. But in all these cases, it is not true that we have obligations to obey permissible law irrespective of content. Instead, we have an obligation to obey the law because, and insofar as, its content is such that condition C is satisfied. The structure of this obligation is clearly content-dependent. Therefore, all theories discussed up to now, including associative ones, fail to vindicate a content-independent obligation to obey the law because it is the law.
Applying the test II: Theories that pass it
I now turn to the positive part of my analysis, by applying the CIT to vindications of political authority that pass it.
Consent
A long-standing tradition in political philosophy holds that the authority of law rests on the consent of the governed. 46 On this view, voluntarily agreeing to do as the law commands is sufficient to justify an obligation to obey it, provided its commands are morally permissible. The relevant property P identified by consent theorists is thus the following: owe is more accurate than the bill provided by the tax authorities.
Consent-based approaches to the obligation to obey the law easily pass the CIT.
Democratic theory
Democratic approaches to political obligation hold that our obligation to obey the law is traceable to the law being the outcome of intrinsically fair procedures, which
give everyone an equal say in determining the rules that should govern them.
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There are, of course, countless versions of democratic theory-each offering somewhat different explanations for the intrinsic fairness of democracy 48 -but they at least share the view that the authority of law derives from its democratic credentials. Looking for property P, this can be characterized as follows:
P: "being the output of democratic procedures."
Property P does appear to pass the CIT. Take system under examination, exhibits the relevant property P: it is democratically validated. Let us then hold everything else constant-including the process through which law is created-but assume that now the law demands that I pay 25000 dollars. Clearly, a change in content makes no difference to whether the property of interest, i.e., "being the output of democratic procedures," is satisfied. Since all else is held constant, the law in question is still the output of democratic procedures, and if it is this feature that explains why we should obey it, then obedience remains unaffected by changes in content. Democratic theory passes the CIT.
Conclusion
I have shown that, contrary to first appearances, prominent theories of political obligation do not vindicate a content-independent obligation to obey the law, and ipso facto, fail in their aim of vindicating political authority. However, I have also suggested that two theories-consent and democratic theory-succeed in passing the CIT. Where does this leave us?
First, let me point out the limits of my inquiry. As I signalled at the start, an ability to vindicate content-independence is typically regarded as a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a successful defence of political obligation. The theories which, I have argued, meet this condition, can certainly be criticized for failing in other respects.
For instance, consent theory is unsatisfactory to the extent that it does not vindicate the universality of legal authority-i.e., its binding all citizens-since only a small number of individuals typically consent to legal obedience. Similarly, democratic theory has come under attack for failing to explain satisfactorily how it is that certain individuals are bound to obey a particular set of laws. As John
Simmons explains, on a democratic view, if the United States annexed a portion of Mexico (perhaps after a referendum in the combined territories of the US and that portion of Mexico) and started to govern the newly acquired population democratically, advocates of purely democratic approaches would have to conclude that former Mexicans are now obligated to obey US law. Yet this appears problematic.
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Even if my discussion cannot deliver a positive defence, or a conclusive refutation, of the obligation to obey the law, reflection on its outcome may help us move the debate forward, by telling us something about the kind of property that a candidate theory of political authority should rely on. Specifically, both consent and democratic theories appeal to procedural properties of the law, i.e., properties that consist in the law being the object of some valuable procedure (e.g., democracy or 
